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Abstract: We propose an intergroup competition scheme (ICS) to theoretically 
solve free-riding in team production and provide experimental evidence from a 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) public goods game. The ICS includes an 
internal transfer payment from the lowest to highest contributing team proportional 
to the difference in group contributions. The ICS requires minimal information, 
makes the efficient contribution a dominant strategy and is budget balanced. These 
features make the ICS ideally suited to solve the moral hazard problem in team 
production. Our experiment demonstrates that the ICS raises contributions to almost 
reach optimality with appropriate parameters. We also show experimentally that the 
success of the ICS can be primarily attributed to the effect of higher returns and to 
the introduction of competition, and is not due to the introduction of potential losses 
or information regarding other groups. 
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21. Introduction
Team production in modern economies has become so commonplace that it is now rare to come 
across a worker who does not work in a team. With so much of the worlds production now done 
in teams, finding ways to increase team productivity is an important economic and managerial 
problem. One approach is to incentivize team members with gainsharing schemes (Welbourne 
and Gomez Mejia, 1995) that link employee benefits to team performance. 
Team production with gainsharing is similar to public goods provision. In public goods 
provision, individuals decide which proportion of an endowment to contribute to a public good 
and which proportion to keep for private consumption. In team production, individuals decide 
what proportion of their time to use towards team production and what proportion to use for other 
activities (e.g., leisure and slack). Moreover, public good provision is shared by all individuals in 
the public and with gainsharing production rewards are shared among all team members. The 
problem of public good provision comes from individual incentives to free ride on the 
contribution of others. Similarly, gainsharing can be subject to moral hazard problems; if only 
aggregate team output is observable, then it is impossible to identify individuals who free ride 
(i.e., provide less than optimal effort for the team).  
The close relationship between team production and public goods provision problems means 
that the extensive literature on public goods provision and especially solutions to the voluntary 
contributions problem are applicable to team production. Indeed, incentive schemes have been 
proposed that offer theoretical solutions to reach efficient outcomes. These theoretical schemes 
include tax-subsidy incentives based on individual team member contributions. For instance, 
Falkinger (1996) shows that rewarding individual deviations from the average group contribution 
to the public good solves the free rider problem.1 Some of the theoretical schemes have been 
tested and perform well in laboratory experiments (see Chen (2008) for a survey).2 For instance, 
Falkinger et al (2000) shows that Falkingers (1996) scheme is successful in a laboratory test.  
Falkingers (1996) result hinges on observing individual contributions to the public good. 
Similarly, in the team production literature, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue that principals 
(owners) need to monitor individual team members to solve the free riding problem. However, 
monitoring individuals may be too costly or infeasible in many cases.  
To overcome monitoring issues, we propose a tax-subsidy scheme to solve the free rider 
problem with direct applications to team production. Critically, and in contrast to Falkinger 
1 Falkingers model follows directly from the literature on private provision of public goods (Warr, 1983; Bergstrom 
et al, 1986; and especially Andreoni and Bergstrom 1996).  
2 Not all of the proposed solutions for public goods provision problems make sense in a team production 
environment. For instance, any tax-subsidy scheme that relies on messages (i.e., Groves and Ledyard, 1977) has no 
direct application for team production.  
3(1996) and others, our proposed Intergroup Competition Scheme (ICS) only requires knowledge 
of the total team production (or a proxy variable) so no individual monitoring is required.  
Our proposed ICS works as follows. Two teams within a firm are matched against each other. 
Team members are compensated in part by gainsharing and in part by an internal transfer 
payment from the low output team to the high output team. The transfer is proportional to the 
difference in team output and equals the difference in output times a parameter. The transfer is 
equally funded by each member of the low output group and is equally shared by each member of 
the high output group. In the theory section (section 3) we show that, for a general class of 
games, parameters exist such that the optimal individual effort to maximize the teams total 
welfare becomes the dominant strategy and the incentive to free ride disappears. Additionally, the 
ICS is budget balanced when considering the two teams (i.e., the principal does not incur any 
costs on top of gainsharing payments),3 requires little information (only team output) and is 
relatively robust to contingencies (adverse selection). 
Our proposed ICS has many potential applications. For instance, the ICS easily applies to 
manufacturing industries that already use gainsharing for team assembly. Consider two teams 
within a firm competing against each other. For simplicity assume that technology is constant and 
output comparable across the competing teams. Suitable examples abound; for instance, it is 
common in manufacturing to use team production for the final assembly of products, from toys to 
computers (Young et al, 1993). In this context teams use the same technology (they have the 
same tools available) and produce exactly the same output with the same number of team 
members. To directly apply the ICS, assembly teams can compete in the total number of products 
assembled during a fixed time period (e.g., a month); in addition to the gamesharing received 
from the number of products assembled, the winning team would receive additional income 
transferred from the losing team proportional to the difference between the total number of 
products assembled by the two teams. Regardless of whether a team is producing more or less 
than the other team, team members will always prefer to assemble the maximum amount of 
products rather than free-ride.  
There are other solutions proposed by theorists and/or used in practice to the moral hazard in 
the team production problem. Holmstrom (1982) solves the moral hazard problem by having the 
principal provide a bonus (a gainshare) to the whole team only if a production target is achieved. 
Dragon et al (1993) propose an inter-team tournament that extends the Holmstrom solution. Both 
schemes theoretically achieve the efficient outcome, but we believe our proposed ICS has several 
advantages. Holmstroms solution hinges on a threshold output; if output is above the threshold 
3 Note that, strictly speaking, the ICS can work without any gainsharing. Optimality can be achieved just by setting 
up a system of intergroup transfers proportional to the difference in team productions. 
4individual agents receive a bonus, nothing otherwise. This approach is very sensitive to 
unverifiable agents contingencies, in other words adverse selection. For instance, if a team 
member becomes temporarily less productive (e.g., gets sick) the threshold may well become 
unreachable and in this case the potential bonus will become ineffective to motivate effort. One 
could imagine that when an agents situation changes, the threshold could be changed 
accordingly to restore efficiency. However, allowing for many potential contingencies that could 
be hard to verify by a principal (and difficult to contract) may alter the optimal threshold too 
often, thus jeopardizing the incentives of agents to contribute the optimal individual effort.4 In 
contrast, with the ICS individuals have the right incentive to maximize team output no matter 
what contingencies emerge. In our example with one team member becoming less productive, the 
other team members would nonetheless have the identical incentive to work. The team would not 
achieve the highest output (if everyone could work), but team members nonetheless have the 
right incentive given the contingency they face.  
We designed two experiments to test the performance of the ICS under controlled laboratory 
conditions. We examined the ICS in the well-known Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM) 
public goods laboratory context. Experiment 1 tests the efficiency of the ICS compared to a 
standard control VCM. Experiment 2 isolates the various factors that change from the control 
VCM to the ICS situation to understand the behavioral effects of each factor. All the treatments 
in both experiments involve 10 repetitions of the corresponding game in a partners design. 
During the first 10 periods all subjects played the standard VCM. They were then assigned new 
partners for the last 10 periods to play in either the control (standard VCM game again) or one of 
the treatments.  
Experiment 1 tests the standard control VCM with a marginal per capita return (MPCR) = 0.5 
against a version of the ICS with a MPCR equal to 1.25. In this version of the ICS the marginal 
per capita return from the output, MPCROUT, is 0.5 and the marginal per capita return from the 
team transfer, MPCRT, is 0.75. Therefore the total MPCR = MPCROUT + MPCRT = 1.25. The 
ICS provides a higher MPCR through the potential transfer, and without having to increase the 
amount paid by the principal.  
Over all periods, we find that the ICS increased the average contribution to the team project by 
over 50 percentage points compared to the control treatment. We observed a strong and typical 
(e.g. Andreoni 1988) end effect in the control condition with contributions declining to just 10% 
on average by the last period. In sharp contrast, in the ICS condition contributions started 
significantly higher from the first period and no end game decline occurred. 
4 Tournaments are similarly sensitive to contingencies; once a contingency happened and members of one team 
realize they cannot win, free riding becomes the best response strategy for them. 
5To better understand why the ICS affects subjects behavior, we designed a second experiment 
with eight new treatments to isolate the key differences between the ICS and the standard VCM 
environment. In addition to focusing on the role of the MPCR, the treatments in Experiment 2 
isolate the ICSs introduction of (a) additional information on the other teams total contribution, 
(b) a competitive element (regardless of the MPCR), and (c) potential losses.  
We find that contributions increase as the MPCR in the ICS increases. This relationship is 
greater when the MPCR is less than 1 than when it is greater than 1, and we observe no additional 
jump in contributions when the MPCR becomes greater than 1. These relationships follow 
theoretically if subjects have other regarding preferences (discussed in section 5). We also find 
that introducing competition in the ICS while holding the MPCR constant also explains part of 
the higher contributions in the ICS. On the other hand, we find that the ICSs introduction of 
potential losses or the additional information it provides on another groups contributions does 
not explain any of the increases in contributions. 
Last, we examined one final treatment in which we altered the ICS to have an external party 
provide the compensation to the team contributing more instead of a transfer from the team 
contributing less. In this treatment, that has been proposed and explored by others, the unique 
Nash Equilibrium predicts that one team will contribute 100% and the other team will contribute 
nothing. The experimental results are consistent with this prediction. Thus, the ICS proposed here 
with an internal transfer produces greater contributions than an otherwise identical externally 
funded scheme since the ICS motivates both teams to fully contribute. 
2. Intergroup Competition Literature
Most of the literature on intergroup competition examines schemes where members of the 
winning group receive a bonus or reward paid by a third party, typically a principal. Thus, in 
contrast to our design, no transfer between the groups occurs under these schemes. 
Rapoport and Bornstein (1987) introduced the intergroup competition (IC) paradigm to 
experimental economics and social psychology. They proposed a binary public goods game 
where two groups compete in aggregate contributions to earn a reward. The primary motivation 
for their setup was to examine the effect of differing endowment sizes, group sizes and game 
structure on contributions in environments with intergroup conflict (Rapoport, Bornstein and 
Erev 1989; Bornstein, Erev and Goren 1994; Bornstein 2003). This early stream of literature 
examined IC as an economic and societal problem (e.g., IC exacerbated inefficiencies in the 
Chicken game in Bornstein, Budescu and Zamir 1997). 
The use of intergroup competition to achieve socially efficient outcomes emerges in Bornstein, 
Erev and Rosen (1990); Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel (2002); and Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport 
6(2006). Intergroup competition is shown to reduce free riding in laboratory social dilemma 
experiments (Tan and Bolle 2007; Reuben and Tyran 2010) and raise effort levels in a field study 
involving team production (Erev et al 1993).5 However, none of the former schemes is budget 
balanced or makes the socially optimal contribution a dominant strategy of the one shot game.6
3. The intergroup competition scheme (ICS) 
We first demonstrate how the ICS generates the optimal solution in the general public goods 
game with the voluntary contributions problem taken from Falkinger et al (2000). Consider an 
economy composed by  individuals with incomes , with   1, ,. Individuals have 
preferences over private consumption , and a public good  represented by a strictly quasi-
concave and differentiable utility function 	
, . The public good is provided by voluntary 
contributions, that is,   å      . Without loss of generality it can be assumed that 
the price of the private consumption is equal to one and the price of the public good is  . 
Therefore, the individual budget constraint for individual  is given by     .  In the 
Nash equilibrium of this public goods game each individual maximizes his utility constrained by 
his own budget, and takes the contribution of all the other individuals as given. An interior 
solution is characterized by       ,   1,  ,. Optimality, however, is given 
by å    . It follows that the public good is underprovided in the Nash equilibrium.  
Now consider two groups,  and , with     individuals each. The groups compete on the 
provision of the public good according to the ICS. Therefore for each individual  in group  the 
budget constraint changes to       
å   å  . That is,  times the 
difference in contributions with respect to the other group (positive or negative) is added to the 
individuals income. Now,       , therefore å      . The 
unique optimal Nash equilibrium, an interior solution, is achieved by making   
1   . 
Note that in the ICS solution preferences are still unobservable; the regulator just needs to know 
5 The introduction of intergroup competition on an online microfinance website has also been shown to raise pro-social lending 
(Chen et al 2013). This is especially interesting given that the competitive element in this study did not directly affect participants 
payoffs, consistent with our result in Experiment 2 that the competitive element of the ICS, holding the MPCR constant, increases 
contributions. 
6 Eckel and Grossman (2005) present evidence from an experiment to test an internally funded tournament intergroup 
competition scheme in one of six treatments to explore the role of group identity on contributions in public goods games. This 
scheme is budget balanced; each member of the group that contributes the most (least) cumulatively over five periods receives a 
bonus of $1 (pays a cost of $1). While the scheme performs quite well, obtaining an average of over 70% of the maximum 
contribution, players no longer have a dominant strategy and no evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies exist. 
7the aggregate contribution to the public good by each of the two groups. Falkingers solution, 
however, requires knowledge of the individual contributions.  
The same ICS can be also applied to solve the moral hazard in teams problem in Holmstroms 
(1982) team production model. A team of  individuals take a costly non-observable action  Î   0,¥ with a private (nonmonetary) cost :  ® ;  that is strictly convex, 
differentiable and increasing with 
0  0. Let   
, ,  Î  º  . The actions taken 
by the  individuals determine a monetary outcome :  ®  that must be allocated among them. 
The function x is strictly increasing, differentiable and concave with .0)0( x  Finally, 
 is 
the share of the output that agent i receives. The preference function of agent i is additively 
separable in money and action, and linear in money. Holmstrom demonstrates the non-existence 
of Pareto efficient, budget balanced sharing rules.  
Once again the optimal solution can be achieved by applying the ICS. We assume there are 
two  member teams,  and , and the difference in output between the two groups multiplied 
by a parameter  is either added or subtracted from each team member. Suppose the sharing rule 
is 
   , with 
, , i.e., team members share the output equally. The 
maximization problem for a member of team  is: max 
  
  
  
Note that i gets a transfer if her group is ahead in output or pays a transfer if her group is behind. 
The first order condition that characterizes the optimal effort is given by:    ¡ ¢¢  ¢£¢  0
Following Holmstrom (1982), optimality implies ¢¢  ¢£¢  0. Hence an efficient solution can 
be achieved through intergroup competition if    ¡  1, therefore   1  . 
For our experiments, we model a team production situation using the standard experimental 
context for public goods and free riding, the well-known and tested Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism or VCM (Davis and Holt 1993). In the VCM participants have the same endowment ¤ and are in teams of size¦. In a general team production context ¤ could be understood as time 
that can be either used for private enjoyment or as a productive input towards team output. In the 
laboratory ¤ is simply a monetary endowment. Each individual has to decide how much of his 
endowment to use as an input to the public account § and how much to keep for himself ¤  §. 
In the VCM, inputs are combined to generate output in the following way:  å §¨ , with ¦ ©
8 © 1. Then output is then shared equally among the N group members. 7 The payoff therefore of 
player  under a VCM is given by: 
ª  
¤  §  ¦«§¬¨¬
With ¢­¢¯  1  ¨ ° 0 and under the usual assumptions, the dominant strategy for each 
individual is to free ride (§  0  ). However, maximum efficiency occurs when each individual 
agent uses her entire endowment as an input, §  ¤,   1, ,¦.  
Again, consider two ¦ member teams, denoted  and . Further, let the difference in 
aggregate inputs between the two groups be multiplied by a parameter . This product is then 
subtracted from the payoff of each member of the team with the lower aggregate contribution8
and added to the payoff of each member in the team with the higher aggregate contribution. 
Participants will not only receive the gainsharing given by the marginal per capita return from the 
team output, MPCROUT = ¨ , but will also receive an additional marginal per capita return from 
the transfer, MPCRT = . Formally, the payoffs of team memberandateam member are: 
ª  ±¤  §²  ¦«§¬¨¬   ³«§¬¨¬ «§¬¨¬ ´
ª  
¤  §  ¦«§¬¨¬   ³«§¬¨¬ «§¬¨¬ ´
In this case, ¢­¢¯  1  ¨   with  Î 
, . If   ¨ © 1, then §  ¤ becomes the 
dominant strategy. Regardless of the inputs of anyone else, it is always in an individual agents 
best interest to use all of her endowment for team production. This prediction for a laboratory 
setup only requires experimental subjects to understand the mechanism and prefer more money to 
less. The unique Nash equilibrium requires all players to contribute the maximum amount, so no 
transfers will occur in equilibrium. That is, the VCM based ICS combines gainsharing, given by 
MPCROUT, with a tournament in which the bonus depends proportionally on (and is funding 
according to) output differences. In equilibrium no bonus is paid, but team members still receive 
a share of the gains. The appendix shows that the VCM based ICS can be trivially extended to 
any number of teams and to any team size.  
7 In a gainsharing team production scheme the principal would distribute part of the profits generated by output to the 
team, not necessarily all of it. 
8 Output is simply a multiplied by the aggregate contribution. 
94. Experiment 1: Testing the ICS 
4.1. Experiment 1 Design
To test the efficiency of the proposed ICS, Experiment 1 examines a control (C) treatment with 
the MPCR=/N<1 so no contribution is the dominant strategy, and an ICS treatment (ICS_dom) 
where the MPCR= +/N>1 so full contribution is the dominant strategy of the one-shot game. 
Every treatment has two stages. In Stage 1 (S1) all subjects played a standard partners VCM 
public goods game (Andreoni 1988). Subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned to 
groups of N = 4 and played the same game with the same partners for 10 periods. In Stage 2 (S2) 
subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned new partners. In the control treatment 
subjects played another 10 periods of the VCM game. In ICS_dom subjects played a 10 period 
intergroup competition game. Full contribution is the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
(SPNE) of the repeated game in ICS_dom. The order of events is the following: 
Order of Events 
Condition Stage 1 
(10: periods w/same partners)
Between Stages Stage 2  
(10 periods w/same partners)
Control C Standard VCM assigned  
new partners 
Standard VCM 
ICS_dom Standard VCM ICS_dom 
Having all subjects initially play the same Stage 1 VCM game establishes a baseline level of 
contribution for all subjects that provides greater precision for estimating treatment effects. With 
this design, we estimate various versions of the following difference-in-difference (DD) model: 
(1)  yi,s = 0 + 1*S2i + 3*ICS_domi + *S2i*ICS_domi + i, 
where yi,s is subject is contribution in Stage s (s = 1 or 2) to the public good that will be either his 
average contribution over all ten periods of the stage or for a specific period within the stage. S2i
is a dummy variable indicator for Stage 2 so 1 estimates changes that occur when the 10 period 
VCM game is repeated in the control. ICS_domi is a dummy variable indicator for the ICS_dom 
treatment so 2 estimates any baseline difference in contributions between subjects in the VCM 
and the ICS treatment during Stage 1. Most importantly,  is the DD estimator measuring how 
subjects contributions in the ICS_dom treatment changed from the VCM game in Stage 1 to the 
ICS treatment compared to how subjects contributions changed in the control treatment when 
subjects repeated the VCM game.9
9 In addition to the greater precision, including S1 provided additional earnings that would minimize the risks of potential 
bankruptcy from potential losses in S2 in the intergroup competition conditions. No subject in ICS ever came close to going 
bankrupt; the lowest balance a subject ever experienced at any time in ICS was $15.00.
10
Procedures: One-hundred and twenty subjects participated in Experiment 1.10 Upon arrival, 
subjects were randomly assigned seats in private cubicles with partitions to prevent subjects from 
seeing or interacting with each other. Once all subjects were seated, they were given the Stage 1 
instructions. The instructions informed subjects that there would be two stages in the experiment. 
No further information on S2 was given during S1. After reading the S1 instructions, subjects 
answered a series of questions to ensure they understood the task, and then played a 10 period 
partners VCM (Andreoni 1988) with an MPCR of 0.5 (/N=0.5). Subjects were randomly 
matched into groups of four for S1 and were informed that they would remain in the same group 
throughout S1. Subjects were given an endowment of 100 cents each period and could contribute 
between 0 and 100 cents to a neutrally framed project in each period. At the end of each period 
subjects received feedback on four pieces of information: their contribution, their groups 
aggregate contribution and their income that period, and their income from all periods. 
At the completion of S1 subjects were given instructions for Stage 2. In S2 subjects were 
rematched randomly into new groups of four which they remained in throughout S2. Each subject 
was informed that none of the participants in her S1 group would be in her S2 group. In the ICS 
treatment, subjects were also informed that their group was randomly matched to another group. 
After the S2 instructions, subjects were given review questions regarding S2. 
In the control (C), subjects payoffs and feedback in S2 were determined identically to S1. In 
ICS_dom, subjects payoffs in S2 also depended on the difference in aggregate contributions 
between their group and the group that they were matched with; each member of the group with 
the higher contribution received 75 percent of the difference in group contributions while each 
member of the group with the lower aggregate contributions had their income reduced by 75 
percent ( = 0.75) of the difference in group contributions. In the event that both groups had equal 
contributions, no money was transferred. Feedback in ICS_dom also included the aggregate 
contribution of the other group and the difference in aggregate contributions between their group 
and the other group. The experiment concluded at the end of S2. 
Table 1 summarizes the key parameters for all treatments (Experiment 2 treatments will be 
discussed below). The first two columns show the number of subjects, sessions, groups and pairs 
of groups (during S2) in each treatment. The next three columns show the return from the public 
good (MPCROUT), inter-group transfer (MPCRT) and total (MPCR) for each treatment. The final 
three columns show the Nash equilibrium in S2 and the average contribution for each treatment 
in S1 and S2, which will be discussed below. 
10 Recruitment involved the on-line email invitation system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) inviting students to participate who had 
volunteered to be in the subject pool for laboratory experiments at the University of Sydney. The experiment was computerized 
using zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
11
Subjects received the sum of their earning across all periods in S1 and S2. On average, 
subjects earned $31.47. At the time of the experiment the exchange rate between the Australian 
and U.S. Dollar was almost exactly one to one and the minimum wage was almost $15 per hour. 
Table 1: Summary of experimental treatments and average contributions 
Treatment Subjects,Sessions 
Groups, 
Group 
Pairs (S2) 
MPCROUT
(a/N) 
MPCRT
 (d)
MPCR = 
MPCROUT
+ MPCRT
Nash 
Eq^ 
(S2) 
Average 
Contribution 
Experiment 1 
Stage 
1 
Stage 
2 
Control  48 2 
12 
n/a 0.50 - 0.50 ti = 0 54.69 50.85 
ICS_dom 72 3 
18 
9 0.50 0.75 1.25 ti = 100 35.11 80.92 
Experiment 2
ICS0.5 72 3  
18 
9 0.25 0.25 0.50 ti = 0 37.88 57.09 
ICS0.75 72 3 
18 
9 0.50 0.25 0.75 ti = 0 37.14 67.61 
ICS0.9 72 3 
18 
9 0.50 0.40 0.90 ti = 0 44.49 83.63 
ICS1.1 72 3 
18 
9 0.50 0.60 1.10 ti = 100 51.83 88.93 
ICS1.75 32 2 
8 
4 0.50 1.25 1.75 ti = 100 41.12 96.01 
ICS1.25Noloss 56 3 
14 
7 0.50 0.75 1.25 ti = 100 51.90 89.35 
INF0.5 72 3 
18 
9 0.50 - 0.5 ti = 0 41.07 34.73 
ICS_ext 64 3 
16 
8 0.50 0.75 1.25 
ti = 100* 
ti = 0* 
39.90 64.03 
Total 632 28 
158 
73 
^ Based on the standard assumptions; * The Nash Equilibrium requires members of one group to contribute everything and 
members of the other group to contribute nothing. 
4.2. Experiment 1 Results
We first examine overall contributions and then subject-level period-by-period behavior. We 
robustly find significantly higher contributions and hence greater efficiency in ICS_dom than C. 
Result 1: The ICS significantly raises contributions.
Table 1 shows that average contributions across all 10 periods in S2 was 30 percentage points 
higher in the ICS_dom (80.92) than in C (50.85). Using each of the 12 groups in C and 9 pairs of 
groups in ICS_dom during S2 for observations, the higher average contribution in ICS than C is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney p < 0.001).11
Figure 1 shows average contributions per period in C an ICS_dom across S1 and S2. 
Contributions in Period 1 of S1 show that despite identical initial conditions, subjects contributed 
11 The observations are not independent since subjects during S2 across groups would have had shared experience (been in the 
same groups) during S1. We econometrically address this concern with subject-level regressions comparing ICS_dom to C in this 
section, and then by using the session as the unit of observation in subsequent analyses. The results are robust to all specifications. 
12
almost 11 percentage points more in C than ICS_dom. Moreover, contributions remain 10 
percentage points or higher in C than ICS_dom in S1 through Period 9. The behavior in S1 
suggests that, despite the sample population size (48 in C and 72 in ICS_dom), subjects were 
more cooperative in C than ICS_dom.12 This difference stresses the importance of having the S1 
baseline contributions to use for control in the analyses that we present next. 
Figure 1: Average contributions over time: Control (C) versus ICS_dom 
Average contributions per period for C and ICS_dom. S1 (S2) is shown to the left (right) of the red line.  
To formally examine the ICS effects, we now present subject-level regressions with difference-
in-difference (DD) analyses to estimate the change in a subjects contributions from S1 to S2 
controlling for gender and period effects. The Hausman Test (pr(2 = 0.999)) indicates that a 
random effects (RE) model is appropriate to control for individual effects in the panel data.13
Table 2 presents the RE model estimates from Equation (1).14 We conservatively use robust 
standard errors clustered at the session level. Column 1 shows estimates for period one only of 
each stage and Column 2 shows estimates over all ten periods. There are two observations per 
subject in Column 1 (one in Period 1 of S1 and one in Period 1 of S2) and 20 observations per 
subject in Column 2 (10 each in S1 and S2). 
Result 2: The effect of ICS is immediate. 
12 The higher average contribution in the Control is unique; average contributions during Stage 1 in the additional treatments 
discussed below for Experiment 2 are much closer to ICS_dom contribution levels than to the Control levels. We extensively 
studied potential explanations (e.g., differences in subject characteristics between the treatments and the days and times of the 
sessions), but could find nothing to explain the higher contributions in the control. With the large number of treatments we 
examined (10), we thus attribute the baseline difference in contributions to noise. In our core analyses, however, our key estimates 
are always difference-in-difference estimators, thus we henceforth always net out these baseline differences. 
13 We also estimated Equation (1) using Tobit Random Effects estimation but do not present these results because these estimates 
have similar significance levels to the RE estimates reported here and thus would not change the interpretation of the results. 
14 We also estimated FE models (available upon request) and find no qualitative differences between the FE and RE models. 
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Table 2: Control (C) versus ICS_dom 
Dependent variable: Individual Contribution  
(1) RE ab    (2) RE abc
Period 1 Periods 1-10 
Constant 63.938*** (5.055) 
60.442*** 
(4.884) 
ICS_dom -8.953  (6.271) 
-10.351(6.276)
S2 5.979  (4.562) 
5.979    
(4.562) 
DD ICS_dom*S2 17.785**  (6.056) 
17.785**  
 (6.056) 
Female -13.451** (5.047) 
-5.060    
 (3.576) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period2  14.618*   (6.289) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period3  19.910**  (6.264) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period4  26.604**  (8.140) 
DDD ICS-dom*S2*period5  39.125***  (8.535) 
DDD ICS-dom*S2*period6  35.924*** (8.389) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period7  34.806***  (8.634) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period8  38.910*** (8.870) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period9  54.021***  (8.029) 
DDD ICS_dom*S2*period10  54.646***  (8.728) 
R-square (overall) 0.119 0.470 
N 240 2,400 
Subjects 120 120 
Models are estimated using individual random effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a Hausman Tests: (Prob>chi2 = 0.999) confirm RE estimation is appropriate. b Standard errors 
clustered by session.  c In Model 2, Period dummies and Period interactions with Treatment and S2 were controlled for in 
the regression (output excluded).
Figure 1 shows that when the ICS is introduced a dramatic change in contributions occurs; 
contributions in ICS_dom are over 20 percentage points higher in Period 1 of S2 than in S1. 
Figure 1 suggests that this effect is not due to subjects starting over with a new group since in C 
contributions in Period 1 of S2 are only slightly higher than they were in Period 1 of S1. 
Consistent with Figure 1, the estimates in Table 2 Column 1 show that subjects in Period 1 of 
S1 contributed directionally less in ICS_dom than in C (-8.95) and contributions in C were 
insignificantly higher in Period 1 of S2 than in S1. The key DD interaction estimate ICS_dom*S2
(p < 0.05) indicates that the introduction of the ICS raised contributions immediately. The 
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introduction of the ICS_dom scheme increased contributions in Period 1 of S2 by 18 percentage 
points more than contributions changed in the control treatment from S1 to S2 in Period 1. 
Result 3: The ICS eliminates the decay in contributions over time.
Figure 1 shows that the difference in contributions between ICS_dom and C increased slowly 
through Period 7 in S2, and dramatically during the final 3 periods. This increasing difference in 
contributions is due to contributions in the ICS_dom not deteriorating over time as is the normal 
pattern in VCM experiments, seen in S1 for both treatments and seen in S2 in C. Column 2 in 
Table 2 presents period-by-period difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimates of the 
relative change in contributions in ICS_dom than C in S2 compared to the changes that occurred 
in S1. In addition to the estimates shown in Table 2, the regressions include controls for period 
and the interaction terms for each period by S2 and for each period by ICS_dom. The DDD terms 
ICS_dom*S2*periodK thus estimate the difference in contributions between ICS_dom and C in 
S2 in Period K relative to Period 1 compared to the difference in contributions between ICS_dom 
and C in S1 in Period K relative to Period 1. Column 2 shows that the average DDD increase is 
highly significant from Period 1 to all future periods. To see the large magnitude, note that during 
the first six periods contributions are increasingly larger in C than ICS_dom in S1 whereas 
contributions are increasingly larger in ICS_dom than C in S2, and over the last three periods in 
S2 the contributions in ICS_dom become dramatically higher than in C (essentially because 
contributions collapse in C while they stay high in ICS_dom).15
In summary, Experiment 1 shows clear evidence that the intergroup competition scheme 
proposed here increases overall contributions dramatically compared to the control group, and the 
effect is immediate and increases overtime without the endgame collapse commonly seen in 
public goods game VCM experiments. 
5. Experiment 2: understanding why the ICS raises contributions 
Full contribution is the unique SPNE of the repeated game if MCPR > 1 while contributing 
nothing is the unique SPNE of the repeated game when MPCR < 1. However, the MPCR > 1 in 
ICS_dom and MPCR < 1 in C is not the only difference between C and ICS_dom. In this section, 
we examine four additional factors: (i) the specific MPCR level; (ii) competition; (iii) potential 
for losses; and (iv) information. These factors may affect contributions if subjects preferences 
include (i) other regarding preferences, (ii) utility of winning or disutility of losing and loss 
15 Although the effect of ICS_dom is dramatic, average contributions in ICS_dom remain below 100 percent. This is 
mostly due to a small percentage of subjects in this condition who in the last period contributed nothing (6 percent) 
or contributed 50 (6 percent); the remaining subjects contributed on average 89%. As we show later, the other ICS 
conditions with MPCR = 0.9, 1.1 and 1.75 demonstrate average contributions closer to 100 percent. 
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aversion, and (iii) social comparisons. We discuss these factors in Sections 5.2-5.5. To test the 
importance of each of these factors, we ran Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 consists of eight additional treatments with 23 sessions, 128 groups and 512 new 
subjects. The procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1. Each session began with the 
same Stage 1 VCM game (with four partners together for all 10 periods). Each subject was then 
rematched into groups with three new partners to play the game in one of the new treatments in 
S2 for 10 periods. Subjects were again paid for their earnings from all 20 periods and every 
subject participated in only one session. All conditions and subjects average contributions per 
treatment are reported in Table 1. Table 3 reports random effects regressions using session level 
data as the unit of observation clustering robust standard errors at the session level. For all 
analyses, each session provides two observations: one for the average contribution during Stage 1 
and one for the average contribution during Stage 2. The contributions during S1 again serve as a 
control for any subject heterogeneity across sessions and treatments. We again estimate variations 
of Model 1, but now use session rather than individual level data. Because no subject participated 
in more than one session, the session level observations are independent. 
Before discussing the new treatments, we first re-estimated the analyses comparing C and 
ICS_dom using the session level data to check the robustness of the individual level analyses 
(Table 3, Column 1). The constant term indicates the average contribution of the subjects in C 
during Stage 1, the Stage 2 dummy variable estimates the effect of transitioning to Stage 2 for 
subjects in the Control, the ICS dummy term estimates the unique effects of subjects in ICS 
sessions during S1, and the DD estimate of the interaction of ICS and S2 is the key estimate 
indicating the effect of transitioning to ICS in Stage 2 compared to staying in the standard VCM 
in S2 for the Control subjects. The estimates in Column 1 are qualitatively identical to those 
reported in Table 2 and discussed above. We again find that subjects contributed less in ICS than 
C during S1. Most importantly, the change to ICS in S2 (the DD estimate) results in a significant 
increase in contributions relative to the change in contributions in C from S1 to S2. The 
magnitude of the DD estimate reflects the simple averages reported in Table 1; the ICS1.25 
condition increased overall contributions nearly 50 percentage points relative to the change in 
C.16
5.1 The effects of the MPCR
We showed (Section 3) that the dominant strategy of the stage game (and the unique SPNE of the 
repeated game) for all agents is to contribute fully when MPCR > 1 and to contribute nothing 
16 The 50 percentage point DD increase can be seen in the simple average contributions seen in Table 1; average contributions fell 
in C by 19.6 (from 54.7 to 35.1) while they rose by 30.0 (from 50.9 to 80.9) in ICS_dom from S1 to S2 for net DD gain of 49.6. 
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when MPCR < 1. This result assumed agents gain utility solely from their monetary payoffs. 
However, if subjects gain utility from increasing the payoffs of their team members, either by 
having altruistic or other regarding preferences, as widely demonstrated in the literature (e.g., 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and that can help explain positive 
contributions in the VCM game with MPCR < 1, then the marginal utility of each additional cent 
contributed will exceed an agents utility from their own payoff by this additional source of utility. 
One can see this by letting subject i have separable utility Ui(x) over her own payoff and that of 
others in her team when she contributes x: Ui(x) = Payoffi,self(x) + iPayoffothers(x), i ³ 0. 
Assuming heterogeneous utility for others, i, it immediately follows that some subjects will get 
higher utility from fully contributing than contributing nothing even when MPCR < 1, and the 
percent of agents with higher utility from fully contributing will (weakly) increase with the 
MPCR when the MPCR < 1.  For MPCR > 1, however, it remains the dominant strategy for all 
agents to fully contribute. 
To test the effect of the MPCR on contributions, we ran five additional ICS treatments. Three 
treatments had MPCR < 1 (ICS0.5, ICS0.75 and ICS0.9) and two additional treatments besides 
ICS_dom (ICS1.25) had MPCR > 1 (ICS 1.1 and ICS1.75). In all treatments with MPCR>0.5, the 
MPCROUT = 0.5 is identical to ICS_dom, and we only varied the MPCRT: MPCRT = 0.25, 0.4, 
0.6 and 1.25 in ICS0.75, ICS0.9, ICS1.1 and ICS1.75, respectively, with total MPCR thus being 
0.75, 0.9, 1.1 and 1.75. In ICS0.5, we let MPCROUT = MPCRT = 0.25 (we discuss this treatment 
in more detail below). To the extent that subjects heterogeneously gain utility from the payoff of 
others in their team, i.e., i > 0, we anticipate that contributions will increase as the total MPCR 
increases for MPCR < 1, and that we will observe full contributions for all MPCR levels above 1. 
Result 4a: Increasing the MPCR in the ICS mechanism increases contributions significantly.  
Result 4b: The marginal MPCR effect on contributions is significantly greater when the MPCR 
is less than 1 compared to when it is greater than 1. 
Result 4c: There is no additional effect of the MPCR on contributions when it is greater than or 
less than 1 other than through its marginal effect in Result 4b. 
Figure 2 shows increasing average contributions as the MPCR in the ICS conditions increase. 
The solid circles show the average contribution of each ICS session during Stage 2 when the ICS 
was in effect. The dominant feature in Figure 2 is the sharp increase in contributions from ICS0.5 
to ICS0.9 (i.e., from MPCR = 0.5 to 0.9) and a more gradual increase when MPCR is above 1. 
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Table 3: Average Contributions Over all 10 periods 
Dependent variable: Average Contribution 
Variables: 
(1) 
Pair-wise 
Robustness 
Check 
(2) 
All ICS 
Robustness 
Check 
(3) 
Tests  
MPCR 
Levels 
(4) Tests  
MPCR 
with  
Dominance 
(5) Tests  
MPCR with 
Dominance 
interaction 
(6) Tests  
Info, No  
Loss and 
Ext 
Constant 
(=Ave in Control in S1) 
54.694*** 
(1.842) 
54.694***   
(1.442) 
54.694***  
(1.463) 
38.852*** 
(4.447) 
25.801***              
(4.792) 
24.932***                  
(4.733) 
Stage 2 Dummy 
(=Ave Shift in Control in S2) 
-3.835*  
(2.249) 
-3.835**   
(1.760) 
-3.835** 
  (1.787) 
-3.835**   
(1.815) 
-3.835** 
(1.844) 
-3.835** 
(1.892) 
ICS Dummy 
(=Ave Difference in ICS in S1) 
-19.577*** 
(4.099) 
-13.421***   
(2.722) 
-13.421*** 
(2.763) 
-13.421*** 
(2.806) 
-13.421*** 
(2.851) 
-13.421*** 
(2.925) 
DD: ICS by Stage 2 interaction  49.641*** (5.081) 
40.595***   
(3.809) 
32.492*** 
(4.417) 
25.876*** 
(3.698) 
20.085*** 
(3.859) 
19.537*** 
(3.940) 
MPCR Effects variables: 
MPCR > 1 Dummy  17.220*** (4.640) 
-2.386    
(5.565) 
33.056**  
(12.080) 
36.383**  
(11.805) 
MPCR 31.683*** (8.382) 
57.786*** 
(9.096) 
59.524***                  
(8.944) 
MPCR by MPCR > 1 Dummy 
interaction 
-38.574**                  
(11.855) 
-41.614***                 
(11.486) 
Treatment Effects variables:
ICS_No Loss Dummy 10.161    (8.683) 
  DD: ICS_No Loss Dummy by  
  Stage 2 interaction 
-6.372    
(7.871) 
INF0.5 Dummy -13.620***   (3.374) 
  DD: INF0.5 Dummy by  
    Stage 2 interaction 
-2.506 
 (4.860) 
EXT Dummy -15.117*** (2.374) 
   DD: EXT Dummy by  
     Stage 2 Dummy interaction 
-0.520    
(5.915) 
Additional Wald Tests:
H0: Coefficients sum to zero 
MPCR by MPCR>1 + MPCR=0 p=0.012 p=0.013 
H0: Coefficients are equal 
DD INF0.5Dummy by Stage 2 =
DD ICS by Stage 2
p=0.000 
H0: Coefficients are equal 
DD EXT Dummy by Stage 2 =
DD ICS by Stage 2
p=0.000 
R2 (overall) 0.975 0.729 0.790 0.808 0.837 0.861 
Observations (2 per session) 10 38 38 38 38 56 
Sessions 5 19 19 19 19 28 
Treatments 2 7 7 7 7 10 
Treatments Control  & ICS_Dom 
+ICS 0.5, 0.75, 
0.9, 1.1, & 1.75 
+ICS 0.5, 
0.75, 0.9, 1.1, 
& 1.75 
+ICS 0.5, 
0.75, 0.9, 1.1, 
& 1.75 
+ICS 0.5, 
0.75, 0.9, 1.1, 
& 1.75 
+ Info,  
No Loss & Ext 
(all treatments) 
Models (1) to (6) are estimated using individual random effects estimation. Contribution data is aggregated over 10 periods into a 
panel of sessions with two stages, the first stage VCM game and the second stage Treatment game. Robust standard errors 
clustered by session in parentheses; Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 3 formally tests the MPCR effects in the ICS treatments on contributions. Column 2 first 
re-estimates the model in Column 1 using the data from all of the ICS treatments (ICS0.5 to 
ICS1.75). The estimated DD effect comparing the change in average contributions from S1 to S2 
in the ICS treatments compared to the change from S1 to S2 in C remains highly significant and 
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the magnitude of the effect remains large (over 40 percentage points).17 Column 3 adds a dummy 
variable to the model that indicates whether the MPCR is greater than 1. The estimates in Column 
3 indicate that the average ICS effect on contributions remains positive and significant when the 
MPCR is less than 1 and is significantly higher when the MPCR is greater than 1; the estimated 
effect of the ICS when the MPCR is less than 1 is a 32 percentage point increase in contributions, 
and the estimated ICS effect increases contributions by an additional 17 percentage points if the 
MPCR is greater than 1. However, this larger effect when the MPCR is greater than 1 may be due 
to a discontinuous shift at MPCR = 1 or reflect a continuous increase in the marginal impact of 
the MPCR on contributions that does not differ when the MPCR is above or below 1. 
To test the marginal effect of the MPCR on contributions, Column 4 adds the variable MPCR 
to the model. Not surprisingly, the estimates show that the MPCR positively and significantly 
increases contributions; on average, a 0.1 unit increase in the MPCR increases contributions by 
3.2 percentage points (p<0.001). Moreover, once we control for the marginal effect of the MPCR, 
the level effect due to the MPCR being greater than 1 disappears entirely. This suggests that there 
is no unique discontinuous level effect when the MPCR becomes greater than 1.  
Figure 2: Average contributions over all 10 periods in S2 by MPCR
Circles = individual sessions; trend lines from Model 5 in Table 3 
To investigate whether the marginal effect of the MPCR is different if MPCR is greater than or 
less than 1, Column 5 adds the interaction term MPCR by MPCR > 1 dummy to the model. The 
estimated negative and significant effect on MPCR by MPCR > 1 in Column 5 indicates that the 
marginal effect of the MPCR is significantly lower when the MPCR is greater than 1, or 
17 Note that the estimated ICS Dummy effect in Column 2 decreases from -19 to -13 when comparing the control to all ICS 
conditions rather than comparing the control to only ICS_dom. This suggests that subjects in ICS_dom contributed less in S1 than 
subjects in all other ICS treatments. Moreover, the fact that subjects in C contributed significantly more in S1 than subjects in all 
the ICS conditions combined (13 cents more) supports the previous discussion that subjects in C were more cooperative than 
typically observed in VCM games, and re-enforces the importance of S1 to control for baseline differences.  
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equivalently and as anticipated, indicates that the marginal MPCR effect on contributions is 
significantly higher when the MPCR is less than 1. Figure 2 includes the estimated slopes of the 
MPCR below and above MPCR = 1 from the Column 5 estimates to show these distinct effects.  
We can also use the estimates from Column 5 to test whether the positive marginal effect of 
the MPCR on contributions when the MPCR is greater than 1 is significant. A Wald test (reported 
at the bottom of Table 3) indicates that the slope of the MPCR on contributions above 1 (equal to 
the sum of estimated effects of MPCR and MPCR by MPCR > 1) is positive and significant 
(slope = 19.2 = 57.8  38.6). Thus, while the marginal MPCR effect is smaller when MPCR is 
greater than 1, it remains positive and significant. Nonetheless, Table 1 and Figure 2 show that 
average contributions are over 96% of the maximum possible contributions when MPCR = 1.75, 
thus there is little room for any further effects of the MPCR beyond MPCR = 1.75. Finally, note 
that Figure 2 also shows that there is no discontinuous increase in contributions around the 
threshold MPCR equal to 1.18
In sum, the effect of MPCR being greater than or less than 1 is only on the slope, and as 
anticipated, the slope is higher when the MPCR is less than 1. The estimated effects of the MPCR 
within the ICS mechanism here are consistent with past studies on MPCR effects. Specifically, 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996) and Brandts and Schram (2001) varied the MPCR from zero to more 
than 1 and found that contributions increased as the MPCR increased but did not increase 
dramatically when the MPCR went from slightly less than one to slightly more than one. This 
evidence supports the value of ICS because ICS presents a method to increase the MPCR with all 
of the benefits discussed above. 
5.2 The effect of competition 
In addition to affecting the MPCR, subjects in the ICS may perceive their group as winning 
when their group contributes more than the other group and losing if their group contributes 
less, regardless of how much they financially win or lose; people may get utility from winning or 
disutility from losing that goes beyond the monetary amount. For instance, Ku et al (2005) find 
evidence of competitive arousal consistent with people gaining utility from winning live and 
online internet auctions. Thus, the element of competition introduced by ICS could explain higher 
contributions in ICS than in the standard VCM control game. 
The ICS0.5 treatment with MPCROUT=MPCRT=0.25 includes the competitive element but 
holds the MPCR at the same level in the control at MPCR=0.5. In ICS0.5 subjects thus faced the 
18 To formally confirm the absence of an increase at MPCR = 1, using the estimates in Column 5 we tested whether 
the sum of the coefficients on MPCR by MPCR>1 dummy and MPCR>1 dummy was equal to zero. The Wald test 
(not shown) indicates there is no discontinuous change at MPCR = 1 at the 10 percent significance level (p>.10).  
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identical total MPCR as the control, but have the competitive ICS element and the potential for 
monetary losses to the other group if the other group contributes more.  
Result 5: The competitive element in the ICS explains part of the higher ICS contributions. 
Table 1 shows that the average contribution in ICS0.5 increased from S1 to S2 by 19.2 
percentage points whereas contributions in the control condition fell 3.8 percentage points from 
S1 to S2. The role of competition, holding the MPCR constant, can be seen in Table 3 in 
Columns 4-6; the DD interaction term ICS by Stage2 in these estimates captures the competitive 
role of the ICS holding MPCR constant since these models control for the MPCR effect (in other 
words, ICS by Stage 2 captures the DD effect of ICS0.5 compared to the control). Columns 4-6 
show that the DD estimates ICS by Stage 2 are significant at the 1 percent level and indicates that 
the role of competition in the ICS scheme increases contributions by 20 percentage points (in the 
more fully specified models in Columns 5 and 6). Nonetheless, competition alone only partially 
explains the positive ICS effects since, as already discussed, increasing the MPCR increases 
contributions even further. 
5.3 The effect of potential losses 
Another difference between the control and ICS conditions is that subjects can potentially earn a 
negative payoff each round of the ICS game if, for instance MPCR > 1, then every subject on one 
team contributes nothing and every subject on the competing team fully contributes. To the extent 
that subjects in the group that contributed less to the public good in ICS perceive the resulting 
transfer to the other group as a loss, loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) predicts that these subjects will incur greater disutility than an equally sized 
monetary gain. Thus, loss aversion suggests that subjects may contribute more in ICS to avoid 
additional disutility associated with losses. The potential for a monetary loss may also be 
perceived as punishment which Fehr and Gächter (2000a,b) show can motivate greater 
contributions to avoid punishment. Thus, subjects may have contributed more in the ICS 
conditions in part to avoid suffering a loss (and perceived punishment). Although losses were rare 
(less than one percent of payoffs were negative), suggesting the concern for losses may not have 
being affecting decisions, it is also possible that losses were rare because subjects were 
contributing more in the ICS to avoid losses in the first place. Thus, to test whether avoiding 
losses caused higher contributions in the ICS conditions, we ran another treatment, ICS_No Loss  
that was in every way identical to the original ICS_dom with MPCR = 1.25, but we removed the 
possibility that subjects could lose money in any period. Specifically, subjects payoffs were 
bounded in each period at 0, and if a subject (or subjects) in a team would have received a 
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negative payoff after the intergroup transfer, then we limited the transfer to avoid losses and 
adjusted the transfer to the group contributing more to equal the truncated amount being 
transferred.19
The last column in Table 3 presents the results. We include a dummy variable for the 
ICS_No Loss treatment to control for subject heterogeneity (this term estimates the different level 
of contributions during S1 in ICS_No Loss compared to the control). We also include a dummy 
variable for the interaction of ICS_No Loss and Stage 2 to estimate the DD change due to the 
treatment from S1 to S2 relative to the estimated change in ICS (since ICS_No Loss is also an 
ICS condition). 
Result 6: Higher contributions in the ICS conditions cannot be explained by a concern for losses. 
Average contributions during S1 in ICS_No Loss are statistically similar to those in the control, 
though directionally subjects in ICS_No Loss contributed a little more. Controlling for this 
heterogeneity, we find that the estimated DD effect of ICS_No Loss is not statistically different 
compared to the estimated DD ICS effect and directionally leads to a slightly smaller change in 
contributions on average (approximately 6 percentage points less). This can also be seen in Table 
1; on average, subjects contributed an additional 45.8 and 37.5 percentage points in ICS_dom and 
ICS_No Loss, respectively. Thus, an identical ICS plan (both with MPCR=1.25) that removes the 
potential for loss (and perceived punishment) has no effect on contributions, and thus cannot 
explain the higher contributions due to the ICS.  
5.4 The effect of information 
Group identity theory (e.g., Rabbie and Horwitz 1969; Tajfel et al 1971; Eckel and Grossman 
2005; Chen and Li 2009) suggests that people can gain utility if their group (in-group) does better 
than another group (out-group), even when there are no financial implications to doing better. 
Group identity theory thus suggests that part of the higher contributions in ICS treatments may be 
due to information about another group. To test whether the difference in the amount of 
information provided to subjects in the ICS treatments explains part of the higher contribution, 
we ran an information treatment INF0.5. In INF0.5, subjects played the same VCM in S2 
identical in every way to C (i.e., same earnings calculation, same MPCR=0.5, and same own 
group feedback), but each group was also paired with another group at the beginning of S2 and 
subjects were given the aggregate contribution of this other group after each period identical to 
the information subjects were given each period in ICS. Column 6 in Table 3 presents the 
estimated effects. We include a dummy variable for INF0.5 (to estimate the unique effects of 
19 In ICS No Loss studied here, full contribution remains the unique Nash Equilibrium of the stage game (and the 
unique SPNE of the repeated game), but is no longer a dominant strategy.  
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subjects in INF0.5 during S1) and a dummy variable for the interaction of INF0.5 and Stage 2 to 
estimate the DD change due to INF0.5 from S1 to S2 relative to the estimated change in the 
control. The bottom of Table 3 also includes a Wald test of significance for whether the estimated 
DD effect of INF0.5 is different than the estimated DD effect of the ICS with the identical 0.5 
MPCR. 
Result 7: information alone cannot explain the higher contributions in ICS. 
Table 1 shows that average contributions in INF0.5 fell 6.3 percentage points from S1 to S2. 
Table 3 shows that subjects in INF0.5 contributed 13.6 percentage points less than subjects in C 
during S1, nearly identical to the 13.4 percentage points lower contributions in S1 in the ICS 
conditions compared to the control. The DD INF0.5 by Stage 2 estimate indicates that the effect 
of introducing information only from S1 to S2 had almost the identical effect on contributions as 
simply repeating the identical VCM in the control; subjects in INF0.5 on average contributed 2.6 
percentage points less from S1 to S2 compared to the change for subjects in the control from S1 
to S2 (p > .20). Thus, information alone on another groups aggregate contributions cannot 
explain any of the higher contributions in the ICS treatments. The Wald test comparing the 
marginal DD effects of INF0.5 to the DD effects of ICS from S1 to S2 further supports this 
conclusion by showing that the introduction of the ICS in S2 significantly increases contributions 
compared to the (lack of) change in contributions in INF0.5.20
5.5 Comparison of ICS to an externally funded scheme 
One of the fundamental ways in which the ICS proposed here differs from past intergroup 
competition literature is that our mechanism includes an internal transfer from the group 
contributing the least to the group contributing the most to induce a dominant strategy in which 
each individual fully contributes to the public good. In other proposed IC plans (e.g., Reuben and 
Tyran 2010) the group contributing the most is funded by a bonus at least partly paid by an 
outside party, and the group contributing the least does not have to pay for the bonus. In this 
alternative externally funded IC plan, if group A contributes more on aggregate then the payoff to 
members of group A and B, respectively, would be: 
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20 In an earlier version of this paper (available upon request) we reported pair-wise comparisons of INF0.5 with C 
and INF0.5 with ICS0.5 that provide the identical conclusion. 
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In this setup, it is easy to show that the Nash equilibrium involves full contributions for all 
players in one group and no contributions by any player in the other group when a/N < 1 and a/N 
+ d > 1, respectively. Thus, the ICS_dom treatment is predicted to provide higher overall 
contributions compared to an external funded IC because only one group will fully contribute 
when externally funded while both groups will fully contribute when internally funded. 
To test this hypothesis, we ran a new treatment ICS_ext where everything is identical to 
ICS_dom except that the group contributing the most receives the d = 0.75 transfer from the 
experimenter rather than from the group contributing less. For ICS_ext, we had 64 subjects 
participate with 16 groups in S1, and 16 groups and 8 pairs of groups in S2.  
Result 8a: The externally funded ICS increases contributions compared to the Control due to the 
higher MPCR. 
Result 8b: Overall contributions are higher in the internally than externally funded ICS. 
Result 8c: The higher overall contributions in the internally funded ICS are driven by 
significantly higher contributions of the group contributing less in the internally funded pairs than 
the groups contributing less in externally funded pairs. 
Table 1 shows that the average contribution in ICS_ext increased from S1 to S2 by 25 percentage 
points whereas contributions in the control condition fell 4 percentage points from S1 to S2 and 
contributions in ICS_dom increased 46 percentage points. Similar to the other ICS treatments, 
Column 6 in Table 3 shows that subjects in ICS_ext contributed significantly less during S1 than 
subjects in the control. The estimates also indicate that once controlling for the higher MPCR 
effect in ICS_ext, there is no additional effect of ICS_ext compared to the control (estimated DD 
effect -0.5). The Wald test comparing the DD ICS_ext and the internally funded ICS DD 
estimates indicates that contributions increased more in the internally funded scheme (p<.001). 
To understand why the internally funded ICS significantly increased contributions more than 
the externally funded scheme, we examine the contributions of the groups which contributed 
more and the groups which contributed less within each pair in the internally funded scheme to 
those groups in the externally funded scheme which contributed more and those which 
contributed less within each pair, respectively. For this examination, we compare ICS_ext to 
ICS_dom in order to have the identical MPCR across the internally and externally funded 
schemes. Figure 3 shows the predicted separating equilibrium behavior in groups in the ICS_ext 
condition. For instance, in six of the nine pairs in ICS_ext the differences in average 
contributions in the last period are at least 50 percentage points whereas in ICS_dom there are no 
pairings that exceed a difference in contributions of 50 percentage points. Figure 3 also generally 
shows the standard decline in contributions in the last few rounds seen in the control (Figure 1) 
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and past VCM studies in ICS_ext among subjects in the groups contributing the lower amount in 
each pair, but not for the subjects in the groups contributing the larger amount. 
Table 4 shows the average contribution in the last period of S2 for the ICS_ext and ICS_dom 
treatments for the groups that contributed the most and the least. As anticipated, there is little 
difference in the contributions by the groups that contributed more in ICS_dom and ICS_ext 
(Mann-Whitney p = 0.318). For the groups that contributed less, however, the ICS_dom subjects 
continued to contribute a relatively high amount (71.0) while ICS_ext contributions collapsed, 
and the difference in contributions between the groups that contributed less in ICS_dom and 
ICS_ext is highly significant (Mann-Whitney p < 0.01). In sum, the ICS_dom theoretically 
increases contributions to participants in both groups whereas the externally funded ICS_ext 
scheme theoretically increases contributions to just one group, and the experimental evidence 
supports this distinction. 
Figure 3: Comparison of higher and lower contributing groups over 10 periods  
(Illustrate the separating equilibrium of the ICS_external condition) 
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Table 4: Contributions in the last period of S2 in ICS_dom and ICS-ext: 
 Group contributing the most Group Contributing the least 
 Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
ICS_dom (N=9) 90.69 13.30 71.00 20.37 
ICS_ext (N=8) 79.84 23.43 22.53 21.41 
5.6 Comparison to experiments examining iniviual bonus/penalty mechanisms 
As discussed in the introduction, our proposed internally funded ICS can be derived from a 
solution to the team production problem that provides bonuses/penalties based on comparing 
individual level contributions to group level production. While our solution addresses the 
information and monitoring challenges of these solutions, it is nonetheless interesting to compare 
the efficiency of our ICS to other studies comparing individual level contributions in order to see 
whether our ICS sacrifices efficiency. Falkinger et al (2000) present experimental evidence that 
introduce a bonus/penalty with an MPCR = 1.1 (their treatment M1) that achieves 84.5% 
efficiency. Bracht et al (2008) provide a comparison of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism with 
Varians (1994) compensation mechanism.21 They find that both mechanisms increase 
contributions towards the optimum, but neither gets close to 80% efficiency. Chens (2008) 
survey argues that some mechanisms (best case scenario) applied to the public goods game 
converge reasonably well to the optimal Nash equilibrium when tested in the laboratory. In 
contrast, the effect of the ICS is immediate. While it is difficult to compare across the 
experimental evidence because of differences in experimental design and subject populations, it 
does not appear that the efficiency of the ICS studied here (with 89% and 96% efficiency when 
the MPCR is 1.1 and 1.75, respectively) is any lower for similar MPCR levels in other studies. 
6. Summary 
In this paper we proposed a solution to the free-rider problem. In theory, with the right 
parameters such that MPCROUT + MPCRT > 1, the ICS induces the efficient contribution to team 
production. Our experiments suggest that optimality can be obtained, and sustained. This result 
can be partially, but not entirely, explained by a taste for competition. It can also be partially by 
the increasing MPCR. The higher contributions are not, however, due to either the possibility of 
loss or the additional information on another groups performance. In line with previous research 
(Palfrey and Prisbrey 1996; Brandts and Schram 2001; Tan and Bolle 2007), high contributions 
can be achieved with the ICS even if the combined MPCR is less than one. We found that 
average contributions of close to 100 percent can be achieved by an ICS with a total MPCR of 
1.75. We also found that if the ICS is externally rather than internally funded, then contributions 
21 In the compensation mechanism each player offers to compensate the other for the costs incurred to make the efficient choice. 
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are lower, and are lower in a manner reflecting the theoretical prediction that in equilibrium one 
group fully contributes while the other group does not contribute.  
In contrast with other schemes, the currently proposed ICS is budget balanced, so no money 
on top of a gainshare needs to be injected externally, and the internal transfer setup makes the 
optimal contribution a dominant strategy of the one-shot game and the unique SPNE of the 
repeated game without having to rely on a taste for cooperation.22 In addition, and what seems 
most practical, the ICS proposed here requires little information - just the aggregate group 
contributions are needed - to effectively overcome the moral hazard problem in team 
production.23
22 In theory, without imposing much structure, the ICS would also work for pure and conditional cooperators. 
23 The ICS may also be robust to sabotage (Lazear 1989); with our ICS sabotage is only profitable if substituting one unit of effort 
away from own group production (a loss of MPRC=MPRCPG+MPRCT) reduces the rival teams production by more than 
s*MPRCT, where s is the number of units of the rivals production that is destroyed by effort devoted to sabotage. For ICS_dom 
studied here, this implies s > 1.25/0.75 = 1.67. In general, s > 1 will minimally be required for sabotage, so sabotage will only be 
profitable if the productivity of effort from sabotage exceeds the productivity of effort for own group production. 
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APPENDIX 
We show that the ICS results established in the text for n = 2 groups of equal size can trivially be 
extended to (1) any finite number of groups n ³ 2 (A.1), (2) groups of different sizes (A.2), and 
(3) extended to non linear public goods games. 
A.1 The ICS extended to any number of groups n  2: 
For n ³ 2, the ICS can be implemented with a balanced budget. We first demonstrate this with n = 
3 groups:  The payoff function for member i in groups A, B and C, respectively, are:  
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To satisfy a balanced budget, the transfers to/from member i in each group must sum to zero. 
This is indeed the case as the sum of the transfers: 
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To generalize, note that with n > 3 groups, if there is an even number of groups then we can 
arbitrarily assign groups to parings to play the ICS. If there are an odd number of groups then we 
can arbitrarily choose three groups to play the ICS as described above, and the remaining groups 
can be arbitrarily assigned to pairings. It immediately follows from above that it is optimal for 
each individual in each group to contribute 100%. 
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A.2 The ICS extended to pairings of groups with different sizes 
Let group A have N members and group B have M members and MN  . For simplicity, assume
www ji  . A modified ICS can be implemented where the aggregate contributions of the second 
group B are transformed into a value that is comparable to the aggregate contributions of group 
A. This is done by converting the aggregate contributions of group B into a proportion of its 
groups aggregate wealth then expressing this in terms of the aggregate wealth of group A.  
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The payoff function for an individual in group B becomes: 
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Because only one groups aggregate contributions are transformed (in terms of the other) the 
inter-group MPCR (d) is invariant to the transformation.  
Further, this transformation still satisfies the condition for a balanced budget: 
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A.3 The ICS can apply to groups of any size 
Both intra-group and inter-group MPCRs are invariant to increases in N. However, the maximum 
size of the inter-group transfer )(
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the opportunity for bankruptcy in out of equilibrium play24. The ICS works best in small groups.  
24 This is not the case with the size of the intra-group return 

N
j
A
jtN
a
1
which remains constant with increases of N due to its 
denominator.  
